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[So F. No. 20123.

In Bank.

Aug. 3, 1959.]

GROVER MAcLEOD, Appellant, V. TRIBUNE PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent.

o

[1] Pleading-Demurrer-Amendment After Demurrer Sustained.
-On appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered after a
special and general demurrer to the complaint was sustained
without leave to amend, the issues presented are whether the
complaint states a cause of action'and, if not, whether there i~
a reasonable possibility that it could be amended to do so.
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Pleading, § 103; [2, 3] Libel, § 41;
[4,7,14,16,23,24] Libel, §'14; [5] Libel, §39; [6] Libel, §52;
[8] Libel, § 10; [9] Libel, § 82; [10, 13] Libel, § 9; [11, 12] Libel,
§ 23; [15, 18] Libel, § 51; [17, 22] Libel, § 31; [19, 20] Libel, § 3;
[21] Libel, §§ 11, 23; [25, 26] Libel; § 30(5); [27] Libel, § 27;
[28] Pleading, § 90.

CJ
Aug. 1959]

MACLEOD 1'. TRIBUNE PUBLI:-5HING

Co.

537

[52 C.2d 536; 343 P.2d 381

L2] Libel-Plea.ding-Admissions-Efrect on Appea.l.-In an action

o

for libel for publication of a report that the "mouthpiece of
the communist party" recommended plaintiff for public office,
assuming that plaintiff's alleged oral admission in the trial
court that such "mouthpiece" printed a list of recommendations
that included his name might be considered on appeal from a
judgment of dismissal, entered after sustaining a demurrer to
the complaint without leave to amend, such admission was not
a concession that the allegations of the complaint were untrue.
[3] Id. - Plea.ding - Admissions - Efrect of Allega.tions of Oomplaint a.nd Demurrer.-In an action for-libel for publication
of a report that the "mouthpiece of the communist party"
recommended plaintiff for public office, plaintiff's alleged admissions in the trial court that such "mouthpiece" printed a
list of recommendations that included his name, standing alone,
would convey the idea that the communist-line paper recommended those listed, but where plaintiff expressly alleged that
"in truth and in fact the [mouthpiece] did not endorse or
recommend plaintiff in said article" and that "all said charges,
references, assertions, and imputations [of defendant's article]
were false," plaintiff's admission could not be interpreted as
meaning that the "mouthpiece" itself recommended him, since
his allegations, admitted by defendant's demurrer, precluded
giving his admission that interpretation.
[4] Id.-Utterances Ooncerning Officers or Oa.ndidates.-The only
reasonable interpretation of defendant's article that the
"mouthpiece of the communist party" defended a proposal to
revive ward politics and printed a list of recommendations for
city council, including plaintiff's name, was that such "mouthpiece" itself recommended plaintiff for election where defendant's article contained no hint that the printed recommendations were not those of the communist-line paper itself, and
where the news value of the article lay, not in the fact that a
person or persons unnamed recommended plaintiff, but in thlJ
fact that the communist-line paper did so.
[5] Id.-Defenses.-In an action for libel for publication of a report that the "mouthpiece of the communist party" recommended plaintiff for public office, the question whether it' was
libelous falsely to chnrge that a candidate for city" council
had been recommended by a communist-line paper or the
"mouthpiece of the communist party" could not be avoided
on the ground that plaintiff denied that such "mouthpiece"
was a comlllunist paper, since rpgllrdless of whether or not
the paper was the "mouthpiece ot" tlw "CllllUiunist party," defeudlwt l!O cluuudel"i;r,ed it aud tlllls iufol"lUed it!! readers
that plaintiff had COllllllunist support, the ~ting of this cha.rge
being present regardless of the truth of the assertion.
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[6] IeL-Pleading-Amendments.-In an action for libel for publication of a report that the "mouthpiece of the cOlUlIlunist
party" recommended plaintiff for public office, although defendant might be entitled to have the complaint clarified to
determine whether it must meet the issue of the charader of
such· "mouthpiece" as well as the issue whether or not it
recommended plaintiff, an appropriate amendment would serve
that purpose, and if plaintiff elected to allege specifically that
the "mouthpiece" was not a communist paper, he would not
allege himself out of court.
[7] IeL-Utterances Concerning Officers or Candidates.-It is just
as defamatory to state that a paper that has recommended
a candidate is a communist paper when it is not as to state
that an admittedly communist paper recommended a candidate
when it did not.
[8] lei. - Words Actionable Per Se - Imputing Communism.-A
charge of membership 1'1. the Communist Party or communist
affiliation or sympathy is libelous on its face.
[9] Id.-Questions of Law and Fact.-Where plaintiff alleged that
defendant's article was intended to be and was understood
as charging that he was a communist sympathizer or fellow
traveler, whether such article was reasonably susceptible of
this interpretation was a question for the court and, if so,
whether it was so understood was a question for the jury.
[10] IeL-Actionable Words.-The code definition of libel (Civ.
Code, § 45) includes almost any language which, on its face,
has a natural tendency to injure a person's reputation either
generally or with respect to his occupation.
[11] Id.-Construction of Langua.ge Used.-The alleged libelous
publication should be construed as well from the expressions
used as from the whole scope and apparent object of the
writer.
[12a, 12b] Id.-Construction of Language Used.-An alleged libelous publication should be measured not so much by its effect
when subjected to the critical analysis of a mind trained in
the law, but by the natural and probable effect on the mind
of the average reader.
[13] Id.-Actionable Words.-A defendant is liable for what is insinuated as well as for what is stated explicitly.
[14] Id.-Utterances Concerning Officers or Candidates.-Defendant's newspaper article reporting that the "mouthpiece of the
[8] Imputation of objectionable political or sociological principles or practices, note, 33 A.L.R.2d 1196. See alRo Cal.Jur.2d,
Libel and Slander, § 104: Am.Jur. Liht'l 111111 I::ilunder, §§ 5, ~ t't S~'l.
[10] See Cal.Jur.2d, Libel and Slander, §§ 40, 85 et seq.; Am.
Jnr., Libel and Slander, § 4 et seq.
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cOUlDlunist party" had recommended plaintiff for public office
might reasonably be interprcted as charging that plaintiff was
a communist sympathizer or fellow traveler since, though comm~ists may support those who do not sympathize with them
or even those they secretly oppose, ordinarily persons or
groups support candidates who are in sympathy with their
objectives, and candidates are judged at least in part by those
who support them. The jury might reasonably infer from such
publication that defendant intended to charge that plaintiff
was unworthy of public office because he was a communist
sympathizer.
[16] ld.-Pleading-Special Damages.-In an action for libel for
publication of a report that the "mouthpiece of the communist
party" recommended plaintiff for public office, plaintiff's allegations that as a result of the libel he suffered pecuniary loss ill
his profession as a dentist in that an "unusually large percentage of old and established patients have been cancelling
appointments" and there "has been a sharp decline in the
number of ncw patients normally to be expected," that he was
informed and believed that such loss was a continuing one,
that the amount of such loss would be $5,000 or more, and
praying for leavp. of court to amend this allegation to insert
the true amount of such loss when it becomes known to him,
were sufficient to plead special damages, the losses being described with sufficient particularity to enable defendant to
prepare its defense and being properly alleged on information
and belief. (Civ. Code, § 48a.)
[16] ld.-Utterances Concerning Officers or Candidates.-Defendant's newspaper article reporting that the "mouthpiece of the
communist party" had recommended plaintiff for public office
was libelous on its face even if it was susceptible of the
innocent interpretation that communist support does not reflect communist sympathy on the part of the person supported.
[17] lll.-Damages-Special Damages.-At common law any written defamation or libel was actionable without proof of special
damages, but a limitation on this rule is recognized when
the defamatory meaning of the language is not apparent on
its face.
•
[18] Ill. - Plea.ding - Special Damages.-Avel'ment and proof of
special damages is required only when the libelous meaning
of the words is covert and not apparcnt on the face of the
language used.
[19] ld.-Elements of Defamation.-To constitute a libel it is not
necessary that there be a direct and spPcific allegation of improper conduct, as in a pleading. The charge lllay be either
expl'essly stated or implied; in the latter case the impliclltior.
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may hI' appan~nt from the language used or of such a character
as to require stah'mcnt and proof of extrinsic facts (inducement, colloquium and innuendo) to show its meaning.
[20] Id.-Elements of Defamation.-Under Civ. Code, § 45a, defining libel on its face and stating when defamatory language
not libelous on its face is actionable, language may be libelous
on its face though it may also be susceptible of an innocent
interpretation. The test is whether a defamatory meaning
appears from the language itself without the necessity of
explanation or the pleading of extrinsic facts; if it does,
whether the charge be directly made or merely implied, the
publication (without averment, colloquium or innuendo) will
in itself constitute a libel.
[21 Id.-Intent and Understanding: Construction of Language
Used.-The fact that an implied defamatory charge or insinuation leaves room for an innocent interpretation as well
does not establish that the defamatory meaning does not appear from the language itself. The language used may give
rise to conflicting inferences as to the meaning intended, but
when it is addressed to the public at large it is reasonable to
assume that at least some of the readers will take it in its
defamatory sense.
[22] Id.-Dama.ges-Specia.l Damages.-The purpose of the rule
requiring proof of special damages when the defamatory
meaning does not appear on the face of the language used
is to protect publishers who make statements innocent in themselves that are defamatory only because of extrinsic facts
known to the reader.
[28] Id.-Utterances Concerning Officers or Candidates.-It would
be a reproach to the law to hold that a defendant intent on
destroying the reputation of a political opponent by falsely
labeling him a Communist or communist sympathizer could
achieve his purpose without liability by casting his defamatory
18liguage in the form of an insinuation that left room for an
unintended innocent meaning.
[24] Id.-Utterances Concerning Officers or Ca.ndidates.-When it
can reasonably be inferred from the language used in a news·
paper article that defendant intended to, charge pluintiff with
communist sympathies nnd that many renders so interpretl!ti
its article, and defendant aumitted by demurring t1\Ut such WIl>I
its intent and the menning plnctld on its article, defendant
mny not be heard to contend thut it should 'escape liabilit.y
on the ground that owing to a possible innocent menning
some of its readers did not dl·aw the defumatory inference it
intended that they should. (Disnpproving possible-innocentmeaning rule of Peabody v. Barham, 52 Cal.App.2d 581 [126
P.2d 6881, followed or repented in Washer v. R,lfIk of AmericlI,

!
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21 Cal.2d 822,828 [136 P.2d 297]; Babcock v. lIfcClatchy News·papers, 82 Cal.App.2d 528, 538 [186 P.2d 737]; Smith v. LOll
An!lell'lI Bookbindl'rs Union, 133 Cal.App.2d 486, 493 [284 P.2d
·194]; Menefee v. Codman, 155 Cal.App.2d 396, 405 [317 P.2d
.1032];· Jef/ers v. Screen Extras Guild, 162 Cal.App.2d 717,
730 [328 P.2d 1030].)
[25] ld.-Privileged Communications-Newspaper Publications.-

C]

In an action for libel for publication of a report that the
"mouthpiece of the communist party" recommended plaintiff
for public office, plaintiff's allegations that defendant published i
the article "falsely and maliciously and with intent to injure,
disgrace and defame plaintiff," and that "all said charges,
references, assertions, and imputations were false, malicious,
and unprivileged, and were calculated to and did expose plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and obloquy," were sufficient, when coupled with allegations that defendant published
its article with knowledge of its falsity or without an honest
belief in its truth, to defeat defendant's eIaim that the article
was privileged. The privilege is also lost if defendant had
no reasonable grounds for believing the statement to be true.
[26] ld.-Privileged Communications-Newspaper Publications.In an action for libel for publication of a report that the
"mouthpiece of the communist party" recommended plaintiff
for public office, though plaintiff did not specifically allege
that defendant knew that its article was false, had no honest
belief in its truth, or had no reasonable grounds for believing
it to be true, one or more of these grounds for defeating the
qualified privilege of a newspaper publication were implicit
in the allegation that defendant's article was false. Any defect
in failing expressly to plead one or more of these bases for
defeating the qualified privilege could easily be curcd by
amendment.
[27] Id.-Mitigation-Retraction.-In an action for libel for publication of a report that the "mouthpiece of the communist
party" recommended plaintiff for public office, plaintiff adequately specified the statements claimed to be libelous so as
to pennit defendant intelligently to comply with plaintiff's
demand for rctraction, as provided in Civ. Code, § 48'a, where
the article was short, it was set out in plaintiff's demand, and
plaintiff, by stating that the article was "grossly libelous" and
demanding a correction or retraction pursuant to § 48a, made
clear that he was objecting to the statement that referred to
him, which statement was libelous on its face.
[28] Pleading - Demurrer - Ambiguity and Uncertainty. - The
court in its discretion muy require the clarification of IlIIY
ullcertainties or ambiguities in the complaint.

542

MAcLEOD v.

TRIBUNE PUBLISHING

CO.

l52 C.2d

. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of A lameda County. Charles Wade Snook, Judge. Reversed.
·Action for damages for libel. Judgment for dcfendant
after sustaining a general and special demurrer without leave
to amend, reversed.
Graves, Hove & MacLeod and Donald MacLeod for Appellant.
Price, Macdonald & Knox, Harry L. Price and John Charles
Houlihan for Respondent.

C)

Cosgrove, Cramer, Diether & Rindge, J. Hart Clinton,
Downey, Brand, Seymour & Rohwer, Herbert E. Hall, John
D. Gallaher, Cooper, White & Cooper, John J. Hamlyn, Flint
& MacKay and McInerney & Jacobs as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-[l] This appeal is from a judgment of
dismissal entered after defendant's special and general demurrer to plaintiff's original complaint for libel was sustained
without leave to amend. Accordingly, the issues presented are
whether the complaint states a cause of action, and if not,
whether there is a reasonable possibility that it could be
amended to do so. (See Lemoge Electric v. County' of San
Mateo, 46 Ca1.2d 659, 664[297 P.2d 638] ; 2 Witkin,California Procedure, Pleading, § 505, pp. 1496-1497.)
Plainti1f's complaint alleged that he is a doctor of dental
surgery practicing in Oakland and that he enjoyed a good
name and reputation in his profession and occupation. On
April 19, 1955, defendant printed, published, and circulated
in its newspaper, the Oakland Tribune, "on the front page
thereof, an article or statement in writing in which said"
defendant" falsely and maliciously and with intent to injure,
disgrace and defame plainti1f, used and pUblished the following language of and concerning the plaintiff:
" 'RED PAPER ISSUES ELECTION EXTRA
" 'The San Francisco People's World, recognized throughout the state as the mouthpiece of the communist party, distributed a last-minute extra edition ill Oakland yesterday,
0/1 the eVe or the I'ity electioll.
" 'It verified reports that the paper is showing unusual
illterest in Oakland and its ~ity election.
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" 'The Communist-line paper defended the proposal to revive ward politics in Oakland and printed a list of recommendations which included the names of council candidates
John F. Quinn, John W. Holmdahl, and Dr. Grover H. MacLeod. It a1<;0 listed recommendations against police reorganization measures which were endorsed by the Alameda County
Grand Jury following its recent investigation.
" 'The polls are open until 7 p.m. today.' "
Defendant "by said publication intended to be understood
by the general public and readers, and it was so understood
by them, as charging, asserting, and imputing that this plaintiff was a communist sympathizer or fellow traveler, and that
this plaintiff had received a recommendation from 'The San
Francisco People's World,' and that the said San Francisco
People's World had 'distributed a last-minute extra edition in
Oakland' which allegedly contained the recommendation as
aforesaid, (when in truth and in fact the San Francisco
People's World did not endorse or recommend plaintiff in said
article), and all said charges, references, assertions, and imputations were false, malicious, and unprivileged, and were
calculated to and did expose plaintiff to hatred, contempt,
ridicule, and obloquy, causing him to be shunned and avoided,
and proximately caused him to sustain a severe and continuing
nervous shock and strain and to suffer great merital anguish, '
mortification, humiliation, and shame; all to his damage in the '
sum of $200,000.00." Plaintiff also suffered pecuniary loss in
his profession as a dentist.
Plaintiff served a demand for a correction upon defendant
pursuant to section 48a of the Civil Code, but no correction
was made. He prayed for special, general, and exemplary
damages and the costs of suit.
"Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing,
printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the
6Ye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or
obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or
which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." (Civ.
Code, § 45.)
.
Defendant contends that plaintiff has not adequately alleged;
that its statement was false and that he conceded ill oral
argument before the trial court that he could not do so. It
points out that the complaint refers to an article iIi the
People's World, that it may be inferred that plaintiff was
named therein, and that plaintiff admitted in the trial court
!.
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that the People's World printed a list of recommendations
that included his name. [2] The transcript of the oral proceedings before the trial court is not before us, however, and
plaintiff's alleged admission appears only in what purports
to be a brief excerpt of that transcript quoted in defendant's
brief in the trial court.1 Even if we assume that under these
" circumstances plaintiff's alleged admission may be considered
on appeal, that admission is not a concession that the allegations of the complaint are untrue. The sting of the alleged
libel is that the People's World, a communist-line paper, endorsed and recommended plaintiff for election and that therefore he was a communist sympathizer or fellow traveler.
[3] We agree with defendant, that standing alone the admission that the paper printed a list of recommendations
would convey the idea that the paper recommended those listed.
Plaintiff expressly alleged in his complaint, however, that "in
truth and in fact the San Francisco People's W orId did not
endorse or recommend plaintiff in said article" and that "aU
said charges, references, assertions, and imputations [of defcndant's article] were false." In the light of these allegations, plaintiff's admission cannot be interpreted as meaning
that the People's World itself recommended him, for his
allegations, admitted by defendant's demurrer, preclude giving his admission that interpretation.
[4] The only reasonable interpretation of defendant's
article, however, is that the People's World itself recom-"
mended plaintiff for election. The article dealt specifically
with the interest being shown by the People 's World in the
Oakland election, it expressly pointed out that that paper defended the proposal to revive ward politics, and it contained
no hint that the printed recommendations were not those of
·the paper itself. Defendant was reporting news, and the
news value of its article lay, not in the fact that a person
or persons unnamed recommended plaintiff, but in the fact
that the People's World did so. Certainly no reader would
reasonably assume that defendant meant no more than that
the People's World had printed the recommendations of unnamed third persons or carried a political advertisement in its
columns. Accordingly, "the question presented is whether it
1" 'THE CoURT: In other words, do I understand that :rou den:r that
the paper printed a list of recommendations which included the name
of the Plainti1ff
" 'Ma. MACLEOD [Plaintiff's counsel]: We do not dell:r that, :rour
Hont)r.' "
..

~
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is libelous falsely to charge that a candidate for city council
has been recommended by a communist-line paper or the
mouthpiece of the Communist Party.
[5] This question cannot be avoided, as defendant contends, on the ground that plaintiff has denied that the People's
World is a communist paper. Defendant states that plaintiff
has pleaded that all of the charges in defendant's article are
false. It contends that he has therefore taken the position that
the People's World is not a communist paper and points out
that it is not libelous to state that a person has been recommended by a noncommunist paper. This contention is patently
absurd. Whether or not the People's World is "the mouthpiece of the communist party" and a "Communist-line paper," defendant so characterized it and thus informed its
readers that plaintiff had communist support. The sting of
this charge is present whether or not the People's World is
in fact a communist paper, and accordingly, even if plaintiff
has taken the position in his complaint that it is not a communist paper, he has not pleaded that defendant's article was
nondefamatory. Moreover, plaintiff's allegations of falsity
may reasonably be interpreted as denying only the charges
as they pertained to him by imputing to him communist support and therefore communist sympathies. [6] Although defendant may be entitled to have the complaint clarified to
determine whether it must meet the issue of the character of
the People's World as well as the issue whether or not it
recommended plaintiff, it is obvious that an appropriate
amendment would serve that purpose, and that even if plaintiff elects to allege specifically that the People's World is not
a communist paper, he will not allege himself out of court.
[7] It is just as defamatory to state that a paper that has
recommended a candidate is a communist paper when it is not
as to state that an admittedly communist paper recommended
a candidate when it did not. 2
'We, of course, intend to express DO opinion as to whether or not the
People's World is the mouthpiece of the Communist Party and a communist-line paper. Defendant in its article stated that it is, but as it
interprets plaintiff's complaint, it has admitted by demurring that it is
not for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the complaint. Unless it
may be judicially noticed that the People's World is a communist paper,
if a cause of aetion is otherwise stated, plaintiff is entitled to put the
character of the People's World in issue. He mny plead falsity either in
the characterization of the paper, the statement of wllom it recoDUuended
or both. If it were judicially noticed, however, that the People's World
is a communist paper, any allegation in the complaint to the contrar'y
52 C.2d-IB
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[8] 'Whatever thc rule 1llay hayc been when anticolllmunist
sentiment was less crystalliu'd Ihan it i~ t.oday (see Harris v.
CUI·tis Publishing Co., 49 Ca1.App.2d 340, 348 [121 P.2d
7.61] ; .Gallagher v. Chet'alas, 48 Cal.App.2d 52, 59 [119 P.2d
408] ), it is now settled that a charge of membership in the
Communist Party or commuuist affiliation or sympathy is
libelous on its face. (Farr v. Bramblett, 132 Cal.App.2d 36,
48 [281 P.2d 372] ; Utah State Fa)·m Bnrea1t Federation v.
National Farmers U.S. Corp., 198 F.2d 20, 23; Grant v.
Reader's D/:gest Ass'?l, 151 F.2d 733, 734; see also Black v.
Clttter Laboratories, 43 Ca1.2d 788, 800 [278 P.2d 905] ; Prosser, Torts [2d ed.] 578; Yankwieh, Certainty in the Law of
Defamation, 1 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 163, 168; note, 33 A.L.R.2d
1196, 1212.) [9] Plaintiff alleged that defendant's article
was intended to be and was understood as charging that he
was a communist sympathizer or fellow traveler. Whcther or
not the article is reasonably susceptible of this interpretation
is a question for the court and, if so, whether or not it wes so
understood is a question for the jury. (Maller v. Devlin, 203
Cal. 270, 278 [263 P. 812] ; Mellen v. Times-Mirror Co., 167
Cal. 587, 593 [140 P. 277, Ann.Cas. 1915C 766] ; Keenan v.
Dean, 134 Cal.App.2d 189, 195 [285 P.2d 300] ; Ga.llaglte1· v.
Chevalas,48 Cal.App.2d 52,58 [119 P.2d 408].)
[10] "The code definition of libel is very broad and has
been held to include almost any language which, upon its
face, has a natural tendency to injure a person's reputation,
either generally, or with respect to his occupation. (Schomberg v. Walker, 132 Cal. 224 [64 P. 290] ; Stevens v. Snow, 191
. Cal. 58, 62 [214 P. 968] ; Tonini v. Cevasco, 114 Cal. 266, 272
[46 P. 103].) [11] In the determination of this question, the
alleged libelous pUblication is to be construed 'as well from
the expressions used, as from the whole scope aud apparent
object of the writer.' (Stevens v. Storke, 191 Cal. 329, 334
[216 P. 371, 373] ; Bettnet· v. Holt, 70 Cal. 270 [11 P. 713,
715].) The case last above cited states that 'not only is the
language employed to be regarded with reference to the aetnal
words used, but according to the sense a11<l meaning under all
the cireumstances attending the puhlil·at.ioll whil·h such lan~uage may fairly be presumed to have cOI1V<'yed to those to
would have to be disregarded (see 2 Wit.kin. California Procedure
Pleading, ~ 208, pp. 1185-1186), and the whole ba~is of defendant 's un~
tenable contention that plaintiff has pleaded that the artil'le was innocent
because he pleaded that the People's World is not a cOIIJUIunist pappr
would collapse.
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whom it wa" published. So that in such cases the language is
uniformly to be reg-arded with what has been its effect, aetual
or presumed, and its sense is to be arrived at with the help
of the cause and the occasion of its publication. And in passing upon the sufficiency of such language as stating a cause
of actioli, n. court is to place itself in the situation of the hearer
or reader, and determine the sense or meaning of the language
of the complaint for libelous publication according to its
natural and popular construction.' [12a] That is to say, the
publication is to be measured not so much by its effect when
subjected to the critical analysis of a mind trained in the law,
but by the natural and probable effect upon the mind of the
average reader. [13] A defendant is liable for what is insinuated, as well as for what is stated explicitly. (ScllOmbel·g
v. Walker, supra, p. 227.)" (Bates v. Campbell, 213 Cal. 438,
441-442 [2 P.2d 383].)
[14] )Ieasured by the foregoing tests, defendant's article
may rcasonahly be interpreted as charging that plaintiff was
a communist sympathizer or fellow traveler. It is true that
Communists may support those who do not sympathize with
them. They may even support openly those they secretly oppose for the very purpose of tainting their opponents with
their own unpopUlarity and thus aiding in their defeat. Ordinarily, however, persons, groups, or parties support candidates
who are in sympathy with their objectives, and candidates are
judged at least in part by those who support them. Indeed
the relevance of plaintiff's supporters to his fituess for public
office is basic to defendant's conteution, discussed later, that
its article was privileged. Its article was published on the day
of the election and pointed out that the polls were yet to close.
It contained no hint or suggestion that the communist recommendations were not to be taken or should not be taken to
mean that communist support reflected communist sympathies
of those supported. Certainly few if any of defendant's readers would conclude that defendant printed the article to assist
plaintiff's clection, nor would they be likely to view it as a
purely neutral gesture. Under the circumstances they might
reasonably infer that defendant intended to charge that plaintiff was unworth)~ of public office because he was a communist
sympathizc.·. A reasonalJIe jury ('ould find that defendant
e1ea.·ly ~() illsi lIualed.
Dcfeuuallt eOlltellus, howevel·, that sillec i!,; artide is llls()
susceptible of an inllocent int.erpl·etatiou, it is not libelous 011
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its face, that therefore an allegation of special damages is
pssential, and that plaintiff's allegations of special damages
are insufficient. (See Civ. Code, § 45a.)
[15] Section 48a of the Civil Code provides that special
damages '.' are all damages which plaintiff alleges and proves
that he has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade,
profession or occupation, including such amount.. of money as
the plaintiff alleges and proves he has expended as a result of
the alleged libel, and no other; . . . " Plaintiff alleged that as
a result of the libel he "has suffered pecuniary loss in his profession as a dentist" in that an "unusually large percentage
of old and established patients have been cancelling appointments," and there "has been a sharp decline in the number of
new patients normally to be expected. Plaintiff does not at
this time know the exact extent of pecuniary loss resulting
from the foregoing, but is informed and believes, and therefore alleges, that said loss is a continuing one, and that the
amount of said loss will be in the sum of $5,000.00 or more;
and plaintiff prays leave of Court to amend this allegation to
insert the true amount of said loss when the same becomes
known to him." These allegations are sufficient. The losses
stated are included in the statutory definition, they are described with sufficient particularity to enable defendant to
prepare its defense, and under the circumstances stated the
extent of the loss may be alleged on information and belief.
(PJ·idonof! v. Balokovich, 36 Ca1.2d 788, 792-793 [228 P.
2d 6].)
.
[16] In any event, defendant's article is libelous on its
face even if it is susceptible of the innocent interpretation
that communist support does not reflect communist sympathy
on the part of the person supported. [17] At common law
any written defamation or libel was actionable without proof
of special damages (see R-est., Torts, § 569; Prosser, Torts [2d
cd.] 587). In Tonini v. Cevasco, 114 Cal. 266 [46 P. 103],
however, this court recognized a limitation on the commonlaw rule when the defamatory meaning of the language used
is not apparent on its face. [18] "It is only when the
libelous meaning of the publication is covert-not apparent on
the face of the language used-that averment and proof of
special damage is required." (114 Cal. at p. 271.) [19] The
limitation was further elu(:idated ill Sc1!omberg v. Walker,
132 Cal. 224, 227-228 [64 P. 290]. "'1'0 constitute a libel it is
)lot necessary that there be a direct and specific allegation of
improper conduct, as in a pleading. The charge may be either
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expressly stated or implied; and in the latter case the implica- i
tion' may be either apparent from the language used, or of
such a character as to require the statement and proof of extrinsic facts (inducement, colloquiz,m, and innuendo) to show
its meaning. In the last case, proper allegations and proofs of
the facts necessary to make the meaning of the language apparent will be required. Otherwise, whether the charge be
directly made or merely implied, the publication-without
averment, colloquium, or innuendo-will, in itself, constitute
a libel. 'The construction which it behooves a court of justice
to put on a publication which is alleged to be libelous is to bl!
derived as well as from the expressions used as from the whole
scope and apparent object of the writer.' (Oooper v. Greeley,
1 Denio, 358.) Thus in the case cited, the charge was not
'made in an open and direct manner'; 'but,' it was said by
the court, 'an imputation made in that form is not the less
actionable.' "
In 1945 the Legislature codified the rule of the Tonini and
Schomberg cases by enacting section 45a of the Civil Code,
which provides:
"A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the
necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face.
Defamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable
unlei!s the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered special damage as a proximate result thereof. Special damages
is defined in section 48a of this code."
[20] When section 45a is read in the light of the Schomberg case it is clear that language may be libelous on its face
even though it may also be susceptible of an innocent interpretation. The tcst is whether a defamatory meaning appears
from the language itself without the necessity of explanation
or the pleading of extrinsic facts. If it does, "whether the
charge be directly made or merely implied, the publicationwithout ave"ment, colloquium, or innuendo-will, .in itself,
constitute a libeL"
[21] The fact that an implied defamatory charge or insinuation leaves room for an innocent interpretation as well
does not establish that the defamatory meaning does not appear from the language itself. The language ui!ed may give
rise to conflicting inferences as to the meaning intended, but
when it is addressed to the public at large, it is reasonable to
assume that at least some of the readers will take it in its defamatory sense. (Sc.'e Spiegel, Defamation by Implication, 29
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So.Cal.L.TIIl\' a06, 312.) In Peabudy v. BarluulI, 52 Cal.App.
2d 581 [126 P.2d 668j, howevcr, thc court overlooked this
fact. In that case the defcndant printed the statement that
"Eddie Peabody's divorcing wife, ten years his senior, is also
·his aunt!" The plaintiff was Eddie Peabody's "divorcing
,"ife," aud she contended that the language charged her with I
incest. Although more charitably minded readers might as- i
sume that the plaintiff was the widow of Eddie's deceased
uncle and not a blood relative, certainly a jury could reasonably infer from the publication of the language it<;elf that
many readers would understand it in a defamatory sense.
Nevertheless, the court held that because of the possible hlllOcent meaning of the lauguage used, it was not defamatory on
its face and that therefore proof of special damages was
essential. The Schomberg case was not cited.
[22] The purpose of the rule requh·ing proof of special
damages when the defamatory meaning does not appear on the
face of the language used is to protect publishers who make
statements innocent in tllemselves that are defamatory only
because of extrinsic facts known to the reader. For example,
a newspaper might erroneously report that "Mrs. A gave birth
to a child last night." Mrs. A has been married only a month.
The language used will take on a defamatory meaning only
to. those who know when Mrs. A was married, and many of
them will also know that the paper made a mistake. In such a
case, general damages for loss of reputation may be trivial,
and the paper's mistake may havc been innocent, for the
content of its report would not alert it to the possibility of
defamation. It is not unreasonable therefore to require proof
of special damages. to establish a cause of action. The case
would he entirely different, however, if the paper reported
that "Mrs. A, who was married last month, gave birth to a
child last night." A charge of immoral conduct is apparent to
all from the language used, and the paper knows and is fully
warned of the defamatory implication. Under the rule of the
Peabody case, however, it would escape liability unlcss special
damages are proved, for the language U!'H'd doeR not exclude
the innocent possibility tlIat MI·s. A was widowed or divorced
a few months he fore her recent nUlI-riage and that the ehild
is that of her forlllP.r husband.
[12b] Such hair-splitting. analysis of lallguage has no
place ill the law of defamation, dealing as it does with the
impact of communications between ordinary human bpings.
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. I t is inconsistent with the rnle that" the publication is to be
mcasured not so much by its effect when subjected to the
. critical analysis of a mind trained in the law, but by the
·natural and probable effect upon the mind of the average
reader." (Bates v. Campbell, 213 Cal. 438, 442 [2 P.2d 383).)
It protects, not the innocent defamer whose words are libelous
only because of facts unkno,vn to him, but the clever writer
vcrscd in the law of defamation who deliberately casts a
grossly defamatory imputation in ambiguous language. It not
only finds no support in, but is contrary to, the provisions of
section 45a, which define, not language susceptible of only one
meaning, but language that carries a defamatory meaning on
its face. [23] It would be a reproach to the law to hold that
a defendant intent on destroying the reputation of a political
opponent by falsely labeling him a Communist or communist
sympathizer could achieve his purpose without liability by
casting his defamatory language in the form of an insinuation '
that left room for an unintended innocent meaning.
[24] When as in this case, it can be reasonably inferred from
the language used that defendant intended to charge plaintiff
with communist sympathies and that many readers so interpreted its article, and defendant has admitted by demurring
that such was its intent and the meaning placed on its article,
it ill befits defendant to contend that it should escape liability
on the ground that owing to a possible innocent meaning some
of its readers did not draw the defamatory inference it intended that they should.
The possible-innocent-meaning rule of the Peabody case was
repeated in a dictum in Washer v. Bank of America, 21 Ca1.2d ;
822, 828 [136 P.2d 297, 155 A.L.R. 1338), and it has been
fonowed or rep<.'ated in subsequent District Courts of Appeal
decisions. (See Babcock v. McClatchy Newspapers, 82 Cal.
App.2d 528, 538 [186 P.2d 737J ; Smith v. Los Angeles Bookbinders Union, 133 Cal.App.2d 486, 493 [284 P.2d 194J;
Mcnefee v. Codman, 155 Cal.App.2d 396, 465 [317 P.2d
1032J; Jeffers v. Sct'cen Extras Guild, 162 Cal.App.2d 717,
730 [328 P.2d 1030J.) To the extcnt these cases are inconsistent with our conclusion herein they are disapproved.
Since it appears from the complaint that plaintiff was a
candidate for public office and thnt d"fendant's article reported fa.·t:;; relevant to his <jlmlificatiolls. defendant contends
that the al"! ide was pl'jvilegcll (see Civ. Code, § 47, subd. 3;
Snively v. Record Pu.blishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 571 [198 P.
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1]) and that plaintiff's allegations of malice are insufficient
t.o defeat the privilege. (See Locke v. Mitchell, 7 Cal.2d 599,
602 l61 P.2d 922]; Harnish v. Smith, 138 Cal.App.2d 307,
310 [291 P.2d 532] ; Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal.App.2d 649, 660661 [171 P.2d 118] ; Irwin v. Newby, 102 Cal.App. 110, 113
[282 P. 810, 283 P. 370J.) [25] Plaintiff alleged that defendant published the article "falsely and maliciously and
with intent to injure, disgrace, and defame plaintiff," and
that "all said charges, references, assertions, and imputations
were false, malicious, and unprivileged, and were calculated to
and did expose plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and
obloquy." Similar allegations of malice have been held sufficient when coupled with allegations that defendant published
its article with knowledge of its falsity or without an honest
belief in its truth. (Washe1· v. Bank of America, 21 Ca1.2d
822, 831 [136 P.2d 297, 155 A.L.R. 1338J; Morcom v. San
Francisco Shopping News, 4 Cal.App.2d 284, 289 [40 P.2d
940] ; see also Tingley v. Times Mirror, 151 Cal. 1, 14 [89 P.
1097J.) The privilege is also lost if defendant had no
reasonable grounds for believing his statement to be true.
(Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal.2d 791, 797 [197
P.2d 713J ; Emde v. San Joaquin etc. Council, 23 Cal.2d 146,
154 [143 P.2d 20, 150 A.L.R. 916J ; Mtles v. Rosenthal, 90 Cal.
App. 390, 407 [266 P. 320] ; see Restatement, Torts, § 601;
Prosser, Torts [2d ed.] 628.) [26] Although plaintiff has
not specifically alleged that defendant knew that its article
was false, had no honest belief in its truth, or had no reasonable grounds for believing it to be true, under the circumstances of this case one or more of these grounds for defeating
the qualified privilege are implicit in the allegation that
defendant's article was false. Thus, with a copy of the People's World election extra before it or readily available, defendant should have had no difficulty in accurately reporting
the extra's recommendations. Defendant's failure to do so
indicates at least a lack of reasonable grounds for its report.
Such failure is also consistent with a lack of honest belief or
intentional falsehood on defendant's part.I •Any defect in
failing expressly to plead one 'or more of these bases for
·We assume in making these eommenta that the People'. World printed
an election extra, and that plaintiff ,only intended to plead that the
paper did not endorse him. Of eourse, if we interpret hill eomplaint as
denying the truth of all of the facts lltated in defendant's article, &lI
alleging, in effect, that the article was entirely falJrieated, an inferential
allegation of bad faith or intentional falsehood would be inescapable.
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defeating the qllaliflp.(J privilp.ge ronld pasily be cured by
amendment.
Section 48a of the Ch·il Code provides in part:
'-'In any action for damages for the publication of a libel
in a newSpaper, or of a slander by radio broadcast, plaintiff
shall recover no more than special damages unless a correction be demanded and be not published or broadcast, as hereinafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher,
at the place of publication or broadcaster at the place of
broadcast, a written notice specifying the statements claimed
to be libelous and demanding that the same be corrected.... "
Defendant contends that plaintiff's demand for a correction
was insufficient and that therefore he has not stated a cause
of action for general or exemplary damages. Plaintiff wrote
defendant's publisher as follows:
"I wish to call your attention to a purported news report
which appeared in the Oaldand TrIbune on Tuesday, April
19, 1955, in all editions on Page 1 of your publication. The
article reads as follows:
" [Entire article set out in 17 typewritten lines.]
"This article is grossly libelous and I therefore demand
that the same be corrected or retracted as provided in Section
48 (a) of the Civil Code of the State of California."
[27] Defendant contends that plaintiff did not adequately
specify" the statements claimed to be libelous" so as to permit
it intelligently to comply with his demand. It relies on
Anderson v. Hearst Publishing 00., 120 F.Supp. 850. In that
case, however, defendant published a lengthy article of three
columns by ten inches in which there were eight references
to the plaintiff. His demand for correction stated that "Your
issue of November 24th, 1952, carried, under the by-line of
Westbrook Pegler, certain statements regarding me which are
untrue, libelous and damaging...• " The demand for retraction was held insufficient on the ground that plaintiff had
failed to specify which of the "certain statements" he deemed
libelous. In the present case, on the contrary, the article was
short, it was set out in plaintiff's demand, and it made only
one reference to him. By stating that the article was "grossly
libelous" and demanding a correction or retraction pursuant
to section 48a, plaintiff made clear that he was objecting to the
statement that referred to him, namely, that a communistline paper had printed a list of recommendations including
his name. Morf'over, that statement was libelous on its fal'e.
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Wr-. cannot believe t.hat. defendant was so unaware of the
-Hij:?,"Jlifirance of what it Ill'inted t.hat it did not realize what
_language plaiutiff objected to and wished corrected. Plaintiff
gave .defendant fair notice and adequately specified "the
statements claimed to be libelous." (Civ. Code, § 48a;
Uhlman v. Farm Stock &- Home 00., 126 Minu. 239, 242 [148
N.W. 102, Ann.Cas. 1915D 888].)
For the reasons stated the trial court erred in sustaining
the demurrer without leave to amend. As indicated in our
discussion, however, there are certain allegations that could
be clarified or more explicitly stated. Moreover, the complaint
may be subject to other grounds stated ill the special demurrer but not urged on appeal. [28] The trial court may in
its discretion require clarification of any uncertainties or
ambiguities. (Wennerholm v. StalL[ord Univ. Sch. of Med.,
20 Cal.2d 713, 720 [128 P.2d 522, 141 A.TJ.R. 1358].)
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Schaner, J., and Dooling, J. pro tern.,· concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I disseut. It is my view that Canon 19 of
Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association relative to
dissenting opinions is in the public interest and should be
carefully adhered to by reviewing courts. Insofar as material
here, it reads: "Except in case of conscientious d;ifference o[
opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should
be discouraged in courts of last rcsort. " (Vol. 62, Reports of
American Bar Association (1937), p. 1129, canon 19.) (Italics
added.) 1
In the present case I conscientiously differ from the con. elusions and reasoning of the majority opinion. It is my view
that one of the most important duties of the judiciary is to
maintain the freedom of the press. Article I, section 9, of the
Constitution of the State of California reads, in part: "Every
(·itizen may freely speak, write, and publish 'his sentimentson all suhjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right;
und no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the libert.y
of speech or of the press." The First Amendment to the COIlstitution of the United States reads, in part: "Congress shall
.. Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Coullcil.
1My views relative to dissenting opinions will be found in Priebe v.
Sinclair, 90 Cal.App.2d 79, at p. 87 1202 P.2il !i771.
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make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof j or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press."
I state that it is one of the most important duties of the
judiciary to maintain the freedom of the press, for the reason
that it is my belief that a free and independent government
can only be preserved by maintaining a 'l"ell-informed electorate. History has demonstrated that the best method of
keeping the citizenry informed is through the medium of the
press. It is my considered opinion that the free press' foremost obligation is to advise the electorate of all the qualifications or disqualifications of each candidate for public office,
which obviously includes his party affiliations, be they communist or otherwise, his associates, the individuals, organizations and groups by whom he is endorsed and who are seeking
his election to public office.
In my opinion, in the present case the defendant has merely,
within the constitutional guarantee, endeavored to comply
with the public duty it owed to the citizenry concerning a
candidate for public office.
Plaintiff was a candidate for the City Council of Oakland
at the April 1955 election. Thereafter he filed a complaint
against defendant, Tribune Publishing Co., I11C., alleging
that he was a doctor of dental surgery practicing in Oakland and that prior to the publication in the Oakland Tribune
hereinafter set forth, he enjoyed a good name and reputation
in his profession and occupation.
It was further alleged:

"That on the 19th day of April, 1955, in all the editions of
said newspaper, defendants printed, published, and circulated,
or caused to be printed, published, and eirc.ulated in said
newspaper, 011 the front page thereof, an article or statement in writing in which said defendants falsely and maliciously and with intent to injure, disgrace, and defame plaintiff, used and published the following language of alid concerning the plaintiff:
'RED PAPER ISSUES ELECTION EXTRA

'TIle San Fl'anrisco People's WOl·lf1. reeogriized throughout the slate :ts the mOlltllpi('('c of tIll! ('ommunist party,
distrilmtecl a last-minute extra euition in Oakland yesterday, on the eve of the cit~- eleetion.
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'It verified reports that the paper is showing unusual
" interest in Oaklaud and its city election.
'The Communist-line paper defended the proposal to
" rcvive ward politics in Oakland and printed a list of
"recommendations which included the names of council
candidates John F. Quinn, John W. Holmdahl, and Dr.
Grover H. MacLeod. It also listed recommendations
against police reorganization measures which were endorsed by the Alameda County Grand Jury following its
recent investigation.
'The polls are open until 7 p.m. today.'
"That Said article and publication was read by the readers
of said newspaper at said time and on said occasion in the
city of Oakland and in the County of Alameda and throughout
the State of California; and that said defendants by said
publication intended to be understood by the general public
and readers, and it was so understood by them, as charging,
asserting, and imputing that this plaintiff was a communist
sympathizer or fellow traveler, and that this plaintiff had
received a recommendation from 'The San Francisco People's
World,' and that the said San Francisco People's World had
'distributed a last-minute extra edition in Oakland' which
allegedly contained the recommendation as aforesaid, (when
in truth and in fact The San Francisco People's World did
not endorse or recommend plaintiff in said article), and all
said charges, references, assertions, and imputations were
false, malicious, and unprivileged, and were calculated to
and did expose plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and
obloquy, causing him to be shunned and avoided, an~ proximately caused him to sustain a severe and continuing nervous
shock and strain and to suffer great mental anguish, mortification, humiliation, and shame; all to his damage in the sum of
*200,000.00. "
As a result of the publication of the article, plaintiff alleges
that he has suffered pecuniary loss, in that an uIlllsually large
percentage of old and established patients have been cancelling appointments and that there has been a sharp decline in
the number of new patients normally to be expected.
It was also averred that plaintiff served on defendant a
demand for retraction, as provided in section 48a of the Civil
Code, but that defendant failed and refused to publish a
retraction. The alleged demand, a copy of which was attached
to the complaint, reads:
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April 27, 1955
J. R. Knowland
Publisher, Oakland Tribune
Tribune Tower
Oakland, California
Dear Mr. Knowland:
I wish to call your attention to a purported news report which appeared in the Oakland Tribune on Tuesday,
April 19, 1955, in all editions on Page 1 of your publication. The article reads as follows:

"RED PAPER

o

ISSUES ELECTION EXTRA

"The San Francisco People's World, recognized
throughout the State as the mouthpiece of the communist
party, distributed a last-minute extra edition in Oakland
yesterday, on the eve of the city election.
"It verified reports that the paper is showing unusual
interest in Oakland and its city election. The communistline paper defended the proposal to revive ward politics
in Oakland and printed a list of recommendations which
included the names of council candidates John F. Quinn,
John W. Holmdahl and Dr. Grover H. MacT.Jeod. It also
listed recommendations against police reorganization
measures which were endorsed by the Alameda County
Grand Jury following its recent investigation.
"The polls are open until 7 p.m. today."
This article is grossly libelous and I therefore demand
that the same be corrected or retracted as provided in
Section 48(a) of the Oivil Code of the State of Oalifornia.
Very truly yours,
sl Grover H. MacLeod, D.D.S.
GROVER H. MACLEOD, D.D.S.
GHM/mjn
The prayer of the complaint was for special damages ill thf"
Rum of $5,000, general damages of $200,000 and exemplary,
I
damages of $200,000.
These questions are presented:
First. Did the complaint state a cause of actiont
No, for the following reasons:
I
1. The article printed by defendant was not libelous as tOI
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the only st.atelmmt cOIl('.erning him he concedes

to be true.::

o

'l'he sole l;talement concerning plaintiff is that the San FranCil;CO People's World printed a list of recommendations for
candidates for the City Council of Oakland and plaintiff's
llame was included thereon.
The law is established in California that there is no libel if
the charge against the plaintiff is true, irrespective of the
wording used by the defendaut in making the charge. (Emde
v. San Joaquin County etc. Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 160 [8]
[143 P.2d 20, 150 A.L.R. 916] ; Babcock v. McClatchy Newspapers, 82 Cal.App.2d 528, 536 [186 P.2d 737]; Glenn v.
Gibson, 75 Cal.App.2d 649, 661 [6] [171 P.2d 118] ; McLaughlin v. Standard Acc. In$. Co., 15 Cal.App.2d 558, 566 [59 P.2d
631].)
The gist of the charge against plaintiff is that the San
Francisco People's World printed a list of recommendations
for theof'fice of councilman of the city of Oakland, which list
included plaintiff's name. Therefore, since it is conceded
that the charge was true, defendant is exempt from liability.
(Emde v. San Joaquin County etc. Council, supra, p. 160.)
2. The article printed by defendant is not libelous because,
under plaintiff's own statement, there is no libelous matter in
the alleged defamatory article.
The substance of the article is that the San Francisco
People's W orId, a San Francisco mouthpiece of the Communist Party, issued an election extra on the eve of a city
election in Oakland showing an unusual interest in an Oakland city election; defended the proposal to revive ward
politics in Oakland; printed a list of recommendations for the
c~ty council, which list included plaintiff's name; and listed
recommendations against certain police reorganization measures endorsed by the grand jury. The article further stated
the hours when the polls would be open. Plaintiff, at the hearing on the demurrer and in this court, has taken the position
that all of the Tribune article is false.'
".At the time of the argument, the following colloquy between the
court and plaintiff's counsel occurred:
"The Court: In other words, do I understand that you deny that the
paper printed a list of recommendations which included the name of the
Plaintiff'
"Mr. MacLeod: We do not deny that, your Honor."
"Plaintiff, in his opening brief, p. 13, states that he "takee the posi·
tion that all of said article is false, and he bas so plentled in his com·
plaint.' ,
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Plaintiff is confronted with this dilemma:
. (a) If it is as.'>umed, as plaintiff unequivocally contends.
that all of tbe 'l'ribune article is false, then he asserts the San
)j'rancisco People's \Vorld is not a communistic newspaper.
)j'or the purposes of the demurrer, the trial court properly
assumed this to be the fact.
The charge concerning plaintiff in the article is the singlc
statement that the San Francisco People's World printed a
list of recommendations which included the names of council
candidates, among others that of plaintiff. Aceordingly, tbe
gist of the alleged defamatory matter is that the San Francisco People's World, declared noncommunistic by plaintiff,
printed a list of recommendations for the city council, among
which plaintiff's name was included,
Obviously, there is no defamatory sting in the statement
concerning plaintiff. The meaning of the charge is plain. He
is not accused of wrongdoing of any kind; in fact, he is not
accused of doing anything. A third party, a San Francisco
newspaper, is charged with printing his name along with those
of two others as recommended candidates.
Plaintiff, a candidate for councilman, is not defamed by a
statement that he is one of three· who were recommended for
the office of city councilman. To say that a candidate for
public office in one city has been recommended by a newspaper
published in another city is no more than saying that the
candidate, without any solicitation on his part, has received
support from a source which he believes will not help him
politically. The fact that a publication is unpleasant or hostile
does not make it actionable. (Mortensen v. Los Angeles Examiner, 112 Cal.App. 194, 202 [2] [296 P. 927].)
It is established law that it is not libelous to accuse one of
doing a legal act, even though stroug epithets are usen in
describing the act. (Sullivan v. lVarner Bros. Thea.tres, Inc.,
42 Cal.App.2d 660, 663 [5] [109 P.2d 760] [hearing denied
by the Supreme Court].) It is also established that in every
actionable defamation it is necessary that there be defamation i
apparent from the words themselves, for no innuendo ean
alter their sense. (Emde v. San Joaq1tin County etc. Council,
supra, p. 159 [7]; Grand v. Dreyfus, 122 Cal. 58, 62 [54 P.
389].)
The complaint here fails to show any defamation apparent
from the words themselves. The words uscd concerning plaintiff are simple and clear and do 110t derame. Charging that a
candidate for public offi('e rerrin'll a rccoIl1nH'IHlation from
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a source which he believes will injure him in his political
campaign may offend him, but where, as here, he is not
. charged with anything othcr than having received the recommendation and he concedes that fact to be true, it does not
libel him. Clearly, therefore, it was not defamatory to charge
. truthfully that a noncommnnistic newspaper printed a list of '
recommended candidates in which plaintiff's name was included.
Counsel for defendant in oral argument aptly illustrated
the point that the article was not libelous per 8e, as follows:
"I wonder if it can be said that the man in the street belicves that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a Communist, or a
Communist sympathizer, or a Communist Fellow-Traveler-"The Chief Justice: Some do.
"Mr. Houlihan: --simply because he was endorsed, if yon
please, which is more than we said in the publication, by the
Communist Party in publications; by reason of the treatment
that he received at the hands of the Communist press, the
most favorable treatment, can it be said that any type of
statement of that kind leaves the man in the street with the
exclusive conviction that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a
Communist or a Communist sympathizer, or a Communist
Fellow-Traveled That is the kind of construction that is
forbidden by all of the decisions of this Court and the District
Court of Appeal, in determining whether or not the language
is libelous per se, because when we get into strained construction we confess the existence of a covert meaning, and the
covert meaning is not what we are looking for in a libel
per se case."
In connection with the foregoing statement, the words of
Mr. Chief Jnstice Gibson, speaking for this court in Gommunist Parly v. Peek, 20 Cal.2d 536, 547 [127 P.2d 889], are
here pertinent. He said: "Not only do plaintiffs vigorously
assert that the Communist Party does not advocate force and
violence, but the decided cases have definitely demonstrated
that the fact here alleged to exist is not the subject of judicial
notice. In State v. Reeves, 5 Wn.2d 637 [106 P.2d 729, 130
A.L.R. 1465], the attorney general of Washington urged, as
do defendants here, that the Communist Party should be kept
off the ballot and that the courts could take judicial knowledge
of the fact that the party advocated force and violence. The
Supreme Conrt refused to take judicial notice of that fact
for the reason that the litigants denied it. Furthermore, it
'vas said, if the court in the election rase were to make a
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judicial finding on the question it would be tantamount to
holding all registered communists were guilty of violating
the criminal syndicalism act in the absence of evidence on
the question. The court pointed out that the cas('s relied
upon by the attorney general in that ease (as are most. of the
cases relied upon by defendants) dealt with the deportation of
aliens, and were cases reviewing an administrative record
which did not involve judicial notice at all. In Ex parte
Fierstein, 41 F.2d 53, a similar contention was made before
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. There the court reversed
an order of deportation which had been predicated on proof
the alien was a communist. Judge Wilbur, speaking for a
unanimous court, held that the court could not take judicial
notice of the fact that the Communist Party advocates force
and violence, and that the order could not stand in the absence
of evidence of that fact. Referring to some of the cases relied
upon by defendants in the present case, the court stated
(p. 54): "Vhile the character of this organization has frequently been considered by the court, and in some very recent
cases, Whitney v. Oalifornia, 274 U.S. 357 [47 S.Ct. 641, 71
L.Ed. 1095] ; Antolish v. Paul (C.C.A.), 283 Fed. 957; Skeffington v. KatzefJ, 277 Fed. 129; Ex parle Jurgans (D.C.),
17 F.2d 507, the decisions in these cases are based upon the
evidence adduced before the court with reference to the character of this organization, and the statements made in the
opinions of the court with reference to that organization are
based upon the testimony before the court, and in no instance
has the court attempted to take judicial notice of the character of this organization.'
"None of the cases cited compels a contrary conclusion.
Most, if not all, of the federal cases relied upon did not involve
the question of judicial notice at all. They were cases involving reviews of determinations by the Department of
Labor, which by law is vested with fact-finding power and
whose determinations were predicated on evidence. These
cases were so distinguished ill the Reeves and Fierstein cases,
!I1tpra. In the case of In re Ooon, 44 Cal.App.2d 531 [112
P.2d 767], the appellate court did state (p. 543): 'It is a
matter of common knowledge that the Communist Party
comes within that category'-that is, within the group that
advocates and practices the overthrow of government by subversive activities. The statement was not only dictum, but
it had no reference to the doctrine of .inuicial knowledge
which was not involved in the case. The same can be said
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of Field v. Hall, 201 Ark. 77 [143 S.W.2d 567J; As was
pointed out in the R.eeves case, supra, to hold that this court
will take judicial notice of the alleged fact that the Communist Party advocates force and violence, without any evi"dence of that fact, would not only require judicial notice of a
fact which plaintiffs and their counsel vehemently deny, but
it would also necessitate a finding that every registered communist is a felon and could be convicted of a violation of our
criminal syndicalist law upon mere proof of membership
in the Communist Party. That is not the law."
(b) If, on the other hand, it is assumed, contrary to plaintiff's claim, that the People's World is a communistic publication, we find there was a charge that a communistic newspaper
printed recommendations favoring measures which were not
communistic and recommendations favoring plaintiff as a candidate. There is no clear meaning from this charge that plaintiff was a communist.
In Harris tI. Curtis Publishing Co., 49 Cal.App.2d 340, 345
[3] et seq. [121 P.2d 761], a charge that many in the plaintiff's community were communists, contained in an article
which severely criticized the plaintiff and others for their
radical policies as officeholders, was held not to be defamatory
as to the plaintiff even though in the article there were veiled
inferences of communistic connections and it was probably
intended to imply that the plaintiff was one of the communist
group. The charge was held to lack the required certainty of
having a clear meaning that the plaintiff was a communist.
Even though a defamatory implication is shown upon the
face of a publication, if it is also subject to innocent interpretation the language is said to be equivocal, and the publication thereof is not libelons per se. (Washer v. Bank of
America, 21 CaUd 822, 828 [2] [136 P.2d 297, 155 A.L.R.
1338] ; Babcock v. McClatchy Newspapers, supra, p. 534 [3] ;
Peabody v. Barham, 52 Cal.App.2d 581, 584 [3] [126 P.2d
668] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court].)
Under either assumption of fact, the article did not charg~
that plaintiff was a communist, and it was therefore not
libelous.
3. Plaintiff cannot by innuendo allegations make libelous
a nondefamatory, simple statement which is not libelous.
Plaintiff has admitted the truth of the gist of the charge, to
wit, the printing of a list by a San Francisco newspaper, and
since there was no defamatory stiug in the statement concerning plaintiff, there was no libel.
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The rille is set.tl~d that. where the word~ of a charge are
not libelolls according to their common usage, the pleader will
not be allowed to change or enlarge their meaning so as to
m~ke such words libelous. (Emde v. San J oaqu·in County etc.
COU1ICil,.sltpra, p. 159 [7]; Jackson v. U·nderwriters' Report,
Inc., 21 CaL<\.pp.2d 591, 597 [6] [69 P.2d 878]; Vedovi v.
Watson & Taylor, 104 Cal.App. 80, 88 [7] [285 P. 418]
[hearing denied by the Supreme Court]; cf. Peabody v.
Barham, supra, p. 584 [3].)
Applying the foregoing rules to the facts of the present
case, it is apparent that the words of the article published
by defendant do not have a defamatory meaning when reasonably interpreted; therefore, they are not libelous. The
language of the charge is as simple, plain and commonplace
as language can be. Nothing is hidden or concealed in the
words. They are admittedly true. Reasonably interpreted,
they convey no defamatory meaning. Plaintiff, by innuendo,
has attempted to alter the sense of simple, ordinary, unambiguous, truthful words to make defamatory language that
is not defamatory. Under the above stated rules he cannot
do this.
Second. Was the articl. published by defendant "fair
comment'"
Yes. Mere expressions of opinion or severe criticism are
not libelous if they clearly go only to the merits or demerits
of a condition, cause or controversy which is under public
scrutiny, even though they may reflect adversely upon the
political activities or fitness for office of an individual who
is intimately connected with the principal object of the attack. (Howard v. Southern Calif. etc. Newspapers, 95 Cal.
App.2d 580, 584 [3] [213 P.2d 399] ; Babcock v. McClatchy
Newspapers, supra, p. 535 [6]; Eva v. Smith, 89 Cal.App.
324, 328 [2] et seq. [264 P. 803] ; cf. Glenn v. Gibson, supra,
p.659 [4] ; Gosewisch v. Doran, 161 Cal. 511,514 [119 P. 656,
Ann.Cas. 1913D 442].) .
From the article published, it appears that it was the aim
of defendant to emphasize what it said was an unusual occurrence--the great interest shown by a San Francisco newspaper in an Oakland city election. It appeared that at this
election the people were to vote on police reorganization
measures which had been endorsed by the Alameda County
Grand Jury, a proposal to revive ward politics in Oakland,
and the election of members of the city council. The article
stated that a San Francisco newspaper immediately before
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the election defended the proposal to revive ward polities
in Oakland, printed a list. or recommendations, which included
the name of plaintiff, and also listed recommendations against
the police reorganization measures. The language of the
article was mild, dignified and tempered and was devoid of
epi~hets and vituperative, scurrilous or abusive statements.
Malversation on the part of plaintiff was not charged.
The article called attention to the fact that it was unusual
for a San Francisco newspaper to print recommendations 011
what defendant regarded as purely local issues at a local
election in another city. Obviously, the issues referred
to in the article were matters of public interest. The article
dealt with an opinion on how the people should vote on
measures and candidates. The cause which was under public
scrutiny related to the merits and demerits of measures and
candidates. Defendant was here calling to public attention
the fact that a San Francisco newspaper was opposing the
recommendations of the Alameda County Grand Jury and
favoring a measure to restore the ward system in the city
of Oakland.
Defendant deemed that it was in the public interest to
oppose the views of the San Francisco newspaper.
It might be implied from the article that since the recommendations printed by the San Francisco newspaper were
unsound as to important measures, they were probably equally
unsound when applied to candidates.
The article was one by which defendant sought to convey
pertinent information to the public on matters of publi(~
interest, and it is obvious that it did not exceed the limits or
fair comment.
The rule is thus stated in Howard v. Southern Calif. etc.
Newspapers, supra, p. 584: "Publications by which it is
sought to convey pertinent information to the public in matters of public interest are permitted wide latitude. In controversies of a political nature, in particular, the circumstances often relieve statements, which might otherwise be
actionable, of possible defamatory imputations. Mere expressions of opinion or severe criticism are' not libelous if
they clearly go only to the merits or demerits of a condition,
cause or controversy which is under public scrutiny, even
though they may adversely reflect upon the public activitie!l
or fitness for office of individuals who are intimately connected
with the principal object of the attack."
In the present case the article wa.,> fair comment, made in a
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political contest dealing with matters of public concern, where
a broad area of discussion is permitted without civil responsibility for damages.
'rhird. Was plaintiff's demand for a retraction effectuoU
No. Section 48a of the Civil Code provides, in part: "In
. any action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper .•• plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages
unless a correction be demanded and be not published ... as
hereinafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher,
at the place of publication ... a written notice specifying the
statements claimed to be libelous and demanding that the same
be corrected. Said notice and demand must be served within
20 days after knowledge of the publication . . . of the statements claimed to be libelous." (Italics added.)
The demand for a retraction is ineffectual unless it specifics the statements claimed to be libelous. (Anderson v.
Hearst Publishing Co., 120 F.Supp. 850, 852 et seq.) In the
present case plaintiff's demand for a retraction was ineffectual
because it failed to specify the statements claimed to be
libelous.
Plaintiff has repeatedly asscrted that he meant by his pleading that all the statements in the defendant's article were
false and libelous. As pointed out above, if all the statements
were untrue, there is no possibility of plaintiff's having been
libeled, because it is obvious that a statement that a candidate
received a recommendation from a noncommunist newspaper
is not defamatory.
Faced with the knowledge that plaintiff claimed that all the
statements in defendant's article were false, defendant could
neither retract nor determine what it was expected to retract.
Defendant could not retract its statement that the San Francisco People's World printed a list of recommendations containing plaintiff's name, because that statement is true, as
plaintiff admits. Defendant could not retract its statement
that the San Francisco People 's World was a communist
newspaper, or if it had retracted such statement in response
to plaintiff's claim that it was untrue, such action would not
have benefited plaintiff. Defendant could not have been expected to retract any of the other statements in the article,
because suell stail'IlIf'nts were aUt'ged by plaintiff to be trut'.
Defendallt, ellga~«'d ill "complex anll fat·-fiulIg activities,"
is not required to retract true statcments or to guess what
statements plaintiff orsired retracted, in view of the require-
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ment of the statute that plaintiff specify the statements
claimed to be libelous. .
Fourth. Was plaintiff's demand for special damages valid1
No. The rule is established that when special damage is
claimed, the naturc of the loss or injury must be particularly
. set forth. It is necessary that the declaration set forth precisely in what way the special damage resulted. (Anderson v.
Hearst Publishing 00., supra, p. 852; Pollard v. Lyon, 91
U.S. 225, 237 [23 L.Ed. 308] ; Peabody v. Barham, supra,
p. 585 [6]; Shook v. Pearson, 99 Cal.App.2d 348, 351 [4]
[221 P.2d 757].)
Oberkotter v. Woolman, 187 Cal. 500 [202 P. 669], relied
on by plaintiff, is not applicable, for the reason that in such
case no special demurrer was directed to the lack of particularity of allegations of special damages, while in the present
case there was such a special demurrer.
Fifth. Did the trial court err in s1tsiaining the dem1trret·
without leave to amend1
No. The defects in the complaiut could not be cured by
amendment, for these reasons :
1. The gist of the statement complained of is true. It is
true that the San Francisco People's World printed a list
of recommendations of candidates in which plaintiff's name
was included. Obviously, plaintiff cannot amend by now
claiming as false what he has pleaded and expressly admitted
to be true. Where, as here, the gist of the charge is true, there
is no libel. Since plaintiff cannot amend to plead that the
gist of the charge is false, this defect cannot be cured by
amendment.
2. Defendant's statements are not defamatory. Plaintiff,
by taking the position that all the article is false, in effect
takes the position that the portion of the article stating that
the San Francisco People's World is a communist paper is
false. It is likewise obvious that there is no defamation or
libel in stating that a noncommunistic newspaper printed an
endorsement of plaintiff. Plaintiff cannot amend to remedy
this defect or change a position which he has taken throughout the entire litigation. It is clearly not defamatory to
charge that a candidate received an unsolicited recommendation from a newspaper-be it commuuistic or noncommuuistic
-and the meaning of such charge cannot be enlarged or
changed so as to make it defamatory. Plaintiff, by the use
of innuendo, cannot state a cause of action.
3. The complaint shows that defendant's statements were
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fair comment, for the art.icle was olle which contained its
mildly expressed views Oil the measures and candidates in a
municipal election. Plaintiff cannot amend to show that the '
fair comment privilege did not apply, nor can he amend to
show actual malice, since pleading of actual malice would
require an allegation that defendant, in making its statement,
knew or should have known the charge to be false. Plaintiff
cannot allege that defendant knew or should have known
the statement to be false, for the reason that the statement
was true, as plaintiff admits.
Since plaintiff could not plead a cause of action through
amending his complaint, the court properly sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend.
I would affirm the judgment.
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. In view of plaintiff's concession
ill the trial court that the People's World had, as stated in
defendant's article, "printed a list of recommendations which
included the name of plaintiff," I am in agreement with the
conclusion reached by Mr. Justice McComb that the judgment should be affirmed.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied August
31, 1959. Peters, J., did not participate therein. Spence, J.,
and McComb, J., were of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

